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N/A: The Law of Evidence in the Uniform Commercial Code

NOTES
THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
The Uniform Commercial Code (hereinafter the UCC), first proposed in
1951 by the American Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,1 has been adopted by forty-eight jurisdictions. 2 While the main purpose of the UCC is to clarify, simplify, and
uniformalize commercial law throughout the states, 8 it will also affect the
law of evidence in several areas. Those changes which reflect the trend of
modem evidentiary rules will enable the UCC to fulfill its main purpose.
However, in some areas the evidentiary aspects of certain commercial problems have not been solved and such failure can, to an extent, hinder the
objective of creating uniformity throughout the various jurisdictions.
The purpose of this note is to explore the areas of evidence law affected
by the UCC, to show how UCC rules relate to pre-existing rules, and to
interpret the probable effect of such UCC provisions upon the law of evidence. The various sections of the UCC treated will be discussed under the
broad categories of presumptions, hearsay, authentication, and relevance. 4
I. PRSUMPTIONS

The term "presumption" is undoubtedly one of the most confusing,
ambiguous, and controversial terms in a legal vocabulary,6 both in meaning
1 Report No. 1 of the Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code
(1962). Reprinted at BAucaa & SUTHERLAND, COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS vii (1964).

Unless otherwise noted, references to the UCC will be to the 1962 Official Text with
Comments.
2 The UCC has recently been adopted by Delaware, Mississippi, South Carolina, Vermont, Florida and North Carolina. The effective dates are: Vermont and Florida, Jan. 1,
1967; Delaware and North Carolina, July 1, 1967; South Carolina, Jan. 1, 1968; Mississippi,
April 1, 1968. Only four jurisdictions have not adopted the UCC; they are: Arizona, Idaho,
Louisiana, and Puerto Rico. Legislation in Arizona and Idaho is expected in 1967. Early
legislation in Louisiana is not expected although the Louisiana State Law Institute Is
studying the UCC. See 3 UCC REP. SERV. Release 5 (July 6, 1966).
3 See UCC § 1-102. In addition to promoting uniformity, clarification and simplicity,
the UCC is intended to promote stability while allowing for evolutionary growth of commercial law. See Void, Construing the Uniform Commercial Code: Own Twin Keys:
Uniformity and Growth, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 49, 60-62 (1964).
4 The parol evidence rule, UCC § 2-202, and the various rules of construction, UCC
§§ 1-205, 2-208, 2-317, 3-118, are not discussed in this Note since they are actually rules
of substantive law and not germane to the procedural topics discussed herein. See
McCoRMICK, EvmENcE §§ 213-14 (1954).
5 E.g., McCormick, Charges on Presumptions and the Burden of Proof, 5 N.C.L. Rzv.
291 (1927). Professor McCormick states: "One ventures the assertion that 'presumption'
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and effect. There is even disagreement as to whether a presumption is a
rule of law or a rule of evidence.8 However, a presumption is generally
defined as a rule of law which draws a particular inference as to the existence of one fact, not actually known, arising from its usual connection with
other particular facts which are known or proved?
There are several classifications of presumptions which may create rather
than abolish confusion. First, the term "conclusive presumption" is mislead-

ing and does not really belong in a treatment of evidence. Wigmore states
that there cannot be such a thing as a conclusive presumption.8 The term
means that when fact A is proven, fact B is to be taken as true, and no
dispute by the adverse party is allowed. In effect, this establishes a substantive rule of law and not a rule affecting the burden of persuasion or of
producing evidence. It has been stated that such a presumption is the
product of a process of evolution. An example of this process is the fact
of long-continued possession of land. While this fact once conferred the
benefit of a rebuttable presumption of a lost grant, it has led to the later
rule that long time possession itself confers ownership.9 Second, the term
"presumption of fact" should be discarded from a discussion of presumptions because, properly speaking, there are no presumptions of fact, only
presumptions of law. 10 When speaking of the mental process of drawing
conclusions from evidence employing logic and experience, it is better to
speak in terms of inferences. If the jury is at liberty to find an ultimate fact,
this should be termed an inference, not a presumption. In the case of a
presumption the law draws a conclusion from the pleadings and the evidence, whereas in the case of an inference the jury draws the conclusion-"
is the slipperiest member of the family of legal terms, except its first cousin, burden of
proof." Id. at 295.
i That a presumption is a rule of law see Gausewitz, Presumptions, 40 MNN. L. R v.
891 (1956); McBaine, Presumptions;Are They Evidence?, 26 CALIF. L. Rv. 519 (1938). That
a presumption is a rule of evidence see Bohlen, The Effect of Rebuttable Presumptions of
Law Upon the Burden of Proof, 68 U. PA. L. REy. 307 (1920).
7 See Illinois Central R.R. v. ICC, 206 U.S. 441, 459 (1907); Lincoln v. French, 105 U.S.
(15 Otto) 614, 617 (1881); Manning v. Insurance Co., 100 U.S. (10 Otto) 693, 698 (1879);
Shepherd v. Midland Mut. Life Ins. Co., 152 Ohio St. 6, 87 N.E.2d 156, 161 (1949).
8 9 WIGMOaE, EvmENcE § 2492 (Sd ed. 1940).

9 McCoanca, op. cit. supra note 4,§ 308, at 640 n.2.
10 Ryan v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 206 Minn. 562, 289 NAV.557, 559 (1939) (dictum);
9 WiGMo RE, op. cit. supra note 8, § 2491.
11 See Cogdell v. Wilmington & W.YL Co., 132 N.C. 852, 44 S.E. 618, 619 (1903).

The presumption has a technical force or weight, and the jury, in the absence of
sufficient proof to overcome it, should find according to the presumption; but, in the
case of a mere inference, there is no technical force attached to it. The jury, in the
case of an inference, are [sic] at liberty to find the ultimate fact one way or the other
as they [sic] may be impressed by the testimony. In the one case the law draws a conclusion. . . and in the other case the jury draws it.
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Third, the term "permissive presumption" is a rule of law which permits,
but does not require one fact to be found from another fact or group of
facts which might not justify the finding as a matter of pure logic. 12 This
type of presumption has been used to describe a situation in which a group
of facts is considered sufficient to warrant the desired inference. Here, then,
presumption would be used much the same as the term "prima facie case," 18
One leading authority14 has suggested that the term "permissive presump,
tion" be used and incorporated into the family of presumptions since judicial
usage follows this method and since both permissive and mandatory presumptions have the advantage of the true presumption: that of allowing the
proponent to "get to the jury."'5, On the other hand, it has been suggested
that the use of the term "permissive presumption" will simply add more
doubt and confusion to an already muddled area. 1
Finally, the mandatory presumption, or the typical legally rebuttable
presumption, is the type which requires that the jury find the presumed
fact or facts to be true in the absence of sufficient rebutting evidence. According to Wigmore17 and the Uniform Rules of Evidence, this is the true
presumption. Uniform Rule 13 provides:
A presumption is an assumption of fact resulting from a rule of law
which requires such fact to be assumed from another fact or group
of facts found or otherwise established in the action.' 8
Similarly, the UCC has adopted the mandatory definition of the term
presumption. Section 1-201(31) of the UCC provides:
"Presumption" or "presumed" means that the trier of fact must find
the existence of the fact presumed unless and until evidence is introduced which would support a finding of its non-existence.10
Therefore, when the term presumed or presumption is used under the
UCC, the mandatory characteristics will attach, and, absent proof contrary
to the presumed fact, a jury must find the presumed fact to be true; in other
words, the party benefitting from the presumption will be entitled to a
directed verdict.
The major problem in this area concerns the precise burden or obligation
that should be imposed upon a party against whom the rebuttable presumption operates. Two main theories exist regarding the type of burden to be
Gausewitz, supra note 6, at 392.
13 See Brosman, The Statutory Presumption, 5 TUL. L. REv. 178, 192-93 (1981).
14 McCormick, supra note 5, at 297.
15 McCoRMICK, op. cit. supra note 4, § 808 at 640-41.
10 Brosman, supra note 13, at 193 n.176.
17 See 9 WiGMORE, op. cit. supra note 8, § 2490.
12

18 Umroazm RuLE OF EviDENcE 13.
19

UCC § 1-201(31). (Emphasis added.)
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placed on a party against whom a presumption operates and these theories
differ in both procedure and effect.
The first theory, advocated by Thayer,20 is that the sole effect of a presumption is to fix the burden of producing evidence on the party against
whom it operates. This would require introduction of evidence sufficient
only to avoid a directed verdict; so the presumption would vanish on the
introduction of any evidence which, if believed, would support a verdict
contrary to the presumption. It is not necessary that the jury actually believe
the evidence, but only that the evidence be sufficient, if believed, to defeat
the presumption. Under this view, therefore, the presumption is solely
within the control of the trial judge. If no evidence is introduced to rebut
the potential presumption, the judge will direct the jury to find the presumed fact if the basic fact is proved. If the requisite quantum of rebutting
evidence is introduced, the case will be treated as though no presumption
ever existed. Wigmore adopted this view2 ' and many courts began to follow
this approach. The Thayer-Wigmore view provided a dear analysis in an
area which had been in a state of great confusion.
However, as early as 1920 several authorities began to feel that the ThayerWigmore approach was not completely in accord with the reasons behind
the creation of presumptions 22 They criticized this approach for giving
too little vitality to rebuttable presumptions, thereby allowing a presumption to be defeated if a witness merely introduces evidence which a jury
would not believe but which might, nevertheless, defeat a presumption.
Certainly if strong reasons called the presumption into existence, it should
not be considered so weak that it will be defeated by a mere recital of words.
Professors Morgan and Maguire23 have taken this second view, advocating
the theory that a presumption should not only shift the burden of producing evidence but should also shift the burden of persuasion. Thus a presumption could not be so easily defeated, but would stand until the jury is
persuaded that the presumed fact is more likely not to exist than to exist.
Thus the trial judge would charge a jury that the presumption stands
unless it is persuaded to the contrary. 24 According to Morgan, this sort of
instruction is more valuable in that it is less confusing to a jury. At the
same time such a rule gives vitality to presumptions, an element which is
20 THAYEa,
A PREmiNARY TREATLSE ON Eviar¢cE 513-89 (1898); accord, Mclver v.
Schwartz, 50 R.L 68, 145 At. 101 (1929).
21 9 WIGmoRE, op. cit. supra note 8, § 2491.
22 See Bohlen, supra note 6.
23 See Morgan, Some Observations Concerning Presumptions, 44 HARv. L REv. 906,
923-24 (1931).
24 For cases approving the practice of instructing the jury on presumptions, see
Hamilton v. Southern Ry., 162 F.2d 884, 888 (4th Cir. 1947); Wellisch v. John Hancock
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 293 N.Y. 178, 56 N...2d 540, 542 (1944); Karp v. Herder, 181 Wash.
583, 44 P.2d 808, 810 (1935).
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lacking under the Thayer-Wigmore approach. Of course, some presumptions
should be entitled to more weight than others, and Morgan has suggested
that presumptions and their resultant burden be classified according to the
reasons for their creation.2 5 Presumptions are usually based on strong
probability, accessibility to the evidence, or social policy, and generally for
such reasons the courts should require a contrary showing by a preponderance of the total evidence before the presumptions are defeated.
A clear example of the differing views on presumptions appears in a
comparison of the approaches taken by the American Law Institute's
Model Code of Evidence 26 and the later Uniform Rules of Evidence. Although the drafters of the Model Code were Professors Morgan and Maguire,
their suggestions were defeated by a vote of 59 to 42 and the Model Code
adopted the Thayer-Wigmore approach to the effect of a presumption.
Rule 704 provides as follows:
(1) Subject to rule 703, when the basic fact of a presumption has been
established in an action, the existence of the presumed fact must be
assumed unless and until evidence has been introduced which would
support a finding of its non-existence or the basic fact of an inconsistent
presumption has been established.
(2) Subject to rule 703, when the basic fact of a presumption has been
established in an action and evidence has been introduced which
would support a finding of the non-existence of the presumed fact or
the basic fact of an inconsistent presumption has been established, the
existence or non-existence of the presumed fact is to be determined
exactly as if no presumption had ever been applicable in the action. 27
In this manner the Model Code adopts the Thayer-Wigmore view that the
sole effect of a presumption is to put on the party against whom it operates
the burden of producing evidence. Such presumptions will be completely
in the hands of the judge and the application of the rule will be simple. 28
However, the Uniform Rules 29 have rejected the Model Code approach
and have adopted the Morgan-Maguire view that a presumption should
affect both the burden of persuasion and the burden of producing evidence.
Rule 14 on the effect of presumptions provides:
Subject to Rule 16, and except for presumptions which are conclusive
or irrefutable under the rules of law from which they arise, (a) if the
facts from which the presumption is derived have any probative value
as evidence of the existence of the presumed fact, the presumption
25

Morgan, supra note 23.

26 ALI, MODEL CODE OF EvmENCE (1942).
27 MODEL CODE OF EvmENcE rule 704 (1942). (Emphasis added.)
28 Comment on Paragraph (2)(b) MODEL CODE OF EvmENE rule 704 (1942).
29 UNIFORM RuLE or EvIDENcE 14, Comm'r's Note.
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continues to exist and the burden of establishing the non-existence of
the presumed fact is upon the party against whom the presumption
operates, (b) if the facts from which the presumption arises have no
probative value as evidence of the presumed fact, the presumption
does not exist when evidence is introduced which would support a
finding of the non-existence of the presumed fact, and the fact which
would otherwise be presumed shall be determined from the evidence
exactly as if no presumption was or had ever been involved. 0
Thus, under the Uniform Rules, as long as there is some probative connection between the basic facts and the presumed facts, the party against
whom the presumption operates will bear not only the burden of producing
evidence but also the burden of persuasion. The reason for adopting this
middle-of-the-road approach rather than the stronger rule that all presumptions, even those with no probative connection between basic and presumed facts, affect the burden of persuasion would appear to lie in the
drafter's fear of constitutional objections.31
These two theories give a useful frame of reference in evaluating the
approach taken by the UCC. The last dause of section 1-201(31) of the
UCC defining presumptions states that presumptions will stand "unless and
until evidence is introduced which would support a finding of its nonexistence." This indicates that the UCC has adopted the Thayer-lWigmore
approach to presumptions. The language used is quite similar to that in
2
the Model Code.3
Thus, a presumption under the UCC will place only the burden of
producing evidence on the party against whom the burden operates. The
result is that no matter how strong the probabilities or policy behind the
creation of a UCC presumption, a mere recital by a party of facts which, if
believed by the jury, could create a triable issue, will defeat the presumption. This is an unfortunate result. It would appear that since most UCC
presumptions are based on the high probabilities of their being true, the
heavier burden, i.e., the burden of persuasion, should be placed on the
person against whom the burden operates. The party who is daiming that
the improbable has occurred and who generally has better access to the
evidence should bear the burden of showing the fact by a preponderance of
the total evidence.
RuLE oF EvwaEcF 14. (Emphasis added.)
That the stronger rule might violate due process, see Tot v. United States, 319 Us.
463, 467 (1943); Mobile, J. & KLC.R.R. v. Turaipseed, 219 U.S. 55, 42 (1910); Gau=citz,
supra note 6, at 411.
32 See 1 NMw YoRK LAW REVIsiON ComM,. FoR 1955, REPORT ON Ttm STUDY OF TIE
UgwoRm CoswciALx CODE 285 (1955).
30 UxIoR
31
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However, by contrast, the term "burden of establishing" has a strong
meaning under the UCC. Section 1-201(8) defines this term as follows:
"Burden of establishing" a fact means the burden of persuading the
trier of fact that the existence of the fact is more probable than its
nonexistence.
Thus a party given the "burden of establishing" under the UCO must show
by a preponderance of the evidence that a presumed fact is or is not true.
When this term is used under the UCC it will require that quantum of
evidence which Morgan feels should follow a presumption.
Presumptions Under Article 3
Generally, the presumptions created in this article are clarifications and
rewordings of law under the Negotiable Instruments Law.88 Although the
UCC speaks in terms of presumptions, and the NIL in terms of "deemed
prima fade," there is little difference in the type of presumption created.
The drafters of the NIL could have chosen a less ambiguous term, or could
have provided a definition of "prima fade" as used under that act. It would
seem, however, that any rule of law that requires the assumption of one fact
from the establishment of another is a presumption, regardless of the language used. A legislature is likely to create a presumption in terms such as
"shall be prima fade evidence" or "shall be presumptive evidence" rather
than "there shall be a presumption that." In the main such statutes receive
similar interpretation, i.e., as mandatory presumptions.8 4 One prominent
authority on the NIL has stated that:
These presumptions are merely prima fade and are not absolute or
conclusive and must be received with caution, sometimes being entitled
to considerable weight and sometimes to very little; generally their
chief importance is to determine the burden or order of proof. 85
This would indicate that the use of "prima fade" under the NIL creates the
usual rebuttable presumption in that use of such terminology will shift the
burden of producing or establishing evidence.38
There is no precise standard concerning the procedural effect of such
"presumptions" under the NIL, i.e., whether the party against whom the
83 UNIFORM. NEGoTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW. (Hereinafter cited as NIL.)

By 1924 the NIL had been adopted in all the states, territories and the District of Columbia. See BRTTOrN, BILIS AND NoTEs § 3, at 12 (2d ed. 1961). See generally Eaton, The
Negotiable Instruments Law: Its History and Its Practical Operation, 2 Micii. L. Ray.

260 (1904).
34 See Brosman, The Statutory Presumption, 5 TUL. L. REV. 17, 41-43, n.68 (1930).
85 OGDEN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS § 390, at 633 (5th ed. 1947).
86 See Comment, Burden of Proof of Due Course Holding Under Negotiable Instru.
ments Law, 1 IND. L.J. 49, 52 (1926).
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presumption operates has the burden of producing evidence or the burden
of persuasion. Since the NIL does not define "presumption," "prima fade,"
or "burden of proof," the effect of using any of these terms is largely a
question for state law which would ultimately depend on whether the
jurisdiction involved adopted the Thayer-Wigmore approach or the MorganMaguire approach to presumptions. The UCC at least has the quality of
definiteness in that it defines its own terms. If used according to its terms
it should provide uniformity of treatment throughout the states.
Section 3-114(3) of the UCC provides that, "Where the instrument or any
signature thereon is dated, the date is presumed to be correct'; whereas
section 11 of the NIL states that where the instrument, an acceptance, or
any indorsement thereon is dated, the date is deemed to be prima facie true.
The UCC has expanded section 11 of the NIL to include any signature on
the instrument 3 7 Under the UCG approach to presumptions, the presumption would disappear when evidence is introduced which could show the
date to be incorrect; a preponderance of the evidence would not be necessary.
Section 3-201(3) provides:
Unless otherwise agreed any transfer for value of an instrument not
then payable to bearer gives the transferee the specifically enforceable
right to have the unqualified indorsement of the transferor. Negotiation
takes effect only when the indorsement is made and until that time
there is no presumption that the transferee is the owner.
The above subsection should be read in conjunction with section 3-307(2)
which provides:
When signatures are admitted or established, production of the instrument entitles a holder to recover on it unless the defendant establishes
a defense.
The purpose of section 3-201(3) is to make it dear that the transferee without indorsement of an order instrument is not a holder and so is not aided
by the presumption that he is entitled to recover on the instrument provided
in section 3-307(2). However, proof of a transfer to him by a holder is
proof that he has acquired the rights of a holder and that he is entitled to
the presumption.3 8 This section is merely a clarification of the law and has
no similar counterpart under the NIL.
Section 3-307 of the UCC provides:
(1) Unless specifically denied in the pleadings each signature on an
instrument is admitted. When the effectiveness of a signature is put
in issue
37 Comment 3 to UCC § 3-114.

38 Comment 8 to UCC § 3-201(3).
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(a) the burden of establishing it is on the party claiming under the
signature; but
(b) the signature is presumed to be genuine or authorized except
where the action is to enforce the obligation of a purported signer
who has died or become incompetent before proof is required.
(2) When signatures are admitted or established, production of the
instrument entities a holder to recover on it unless the defendant
establishes a defense.
(3) After it is shown that a defense exists a person claiming the rights of
a holder in due course has the burden of establishing that he or some
person under whom he claims is in all respects a holder in due course.
This section, concerning the burden of establishing signatures, defenses,
and due course holding, has given rise to conflicting opinions regarding
both its effect and desirability. Although the NIL contains no provision
with respect to proof of signatures, the UCC provides that all signatures are
admitted unless specifically denied. This reverses the common law rule 0
which allowed evidence regarding the making of the instrument to be
introduced, even under a general denial. The UCG further states that when
denied, the burden of establishing a signature is placed on the party claiming under it. This burden would require proof by a preponderance of the
evidence. However, at this point the UCC makes an about-face and states
that, unless an action is to enforce the obligation of a purported signer
who has died or become incompetent, the signature is presumed to be
genuine or authorized. Thus the plaintiff would still not have to prove that
the document is authentic until some evidence is introduced which would
support a finding that the signature is forged or unauthorized. In order to
put the signature in issue, the defendant need not introduce evidence
sufficient for a directed verdict in his favor, yet he must present enough
evidence to permit a finding in his favor. Section 3-307(l)(b) has been
criticized on the ground that a party, who, by unsworn allegations, asserts
genuiness gets the benefit of a presumption of the truthfulness of his allegations, even though the adverse party has filed a verified plea alleging forgery
or execution without authority. 40 However, this criticism does not appear
to be very well-founded since evidence on which the verified plea is based
will, if strong enough, defeat the presumption. Once the presumption is
defeated, then the burden will pass to the party claiming under it to prove
its authenticity. The basis for the presumption is the practical matter that
39 Hoffstaeder v. Lichtenstein, 203 App. Div. 494, 196 N.Y. Supp. 577 (1922) (common
law rule).
40 Britton, Holder in Due Course-A Comparison of the Provisions of the Negotiable
Instruments Law with Those of Article 3 of the Proposed Commercial Code, 49 Niv. U.L.

Rv. 417, 449 (1954).
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forged signatures are generally uncommon and that normally such evidence
is more accessible to the defendant.4
However since this presumption is based on both a high degree of probability and of accessibility to the evidence, it would appear to be desirable
to place the burden of persuasion on the opposing party. Unfortunately,
the UCC definition of a presumption precludes such a result, and passes
42
the burden of persuasion to the party claiming under the instrument.
The remainder of section 307 deals with the burden of proof in holder
in due course problems. Subsections (2) and (3) are basically rephrasings
and clarifications of section 59 of the NIL. Subsection (2) provides that
once signatures are admitted and the instrument is produced, a holder may
recover unless the defendant establishes a defense, and the defendant will
have to do this by a preponderance of the total evidence under the UCC
definition of "establishing." Until the defendant meets this burden there
will be no issue as to whether a holder is a holder in due course. Thus, if
at trial the plaintiff introduces an instrument in evidence, offers no further
evidence, and the defendant offers no evidence, the plaintiff would be entitled to a directed verdict. This would also be the result under the NIL.3
However, under the UGC, when a defense is shown the burden will shift to
the plaintiff to give affirmative proof that he is holder in due course, i.e.,
that he took in good faith and without notice. 44 Any defense under the UCC
will shift the burden of proof; this reverses the rule under the NIL which
found that a showing of want of consideration was not an adequate defense
to shift the burden. 45
Under the NIL there was a split of authority regarding proof of due
course holding once the issue was in the trial, that is, after the defendant
had shown a defense and defeated the presumption of due course holding.
The majority rule, once the presumption was defeated, placed the burden of
showing due course holding on the plaintiff who then had to convince the
triers of fact of the existence of each of the three requisites of due course
holding, i.e., purchase for value, before it was overdue, and in good faith.4 0
The minority view found that the burden was on the plaintiff only to the
extent of producing sufficient evidence of due course holding to the point
where he could prevent a directed verdict for the defendant. 47
41

Comment 1 to UCC § 3-507.

42
43

For the UCC definition of "burden of establishing" see UCC § 1-201(8).
See cases collected in BulroN, BILLS AND NorTs § 105, at 441 n.1 (1st ed. 1943).

44

UCC § 3-307(3) and Comment 3.

Pitillo v. Demetry, 112 Ga. App. 643, 145 SX-2d 192 (1965) (decided under UCC);
Mitchell v. Baldwin, 88 App. Div. 265, 84 N.Y. Supp. 1043 (1903) (pre-UCC rule).
46 For an excellent statement of this rule, see Glendo State Bank v. Abbot, S0 Wyo. 98,
216 Pac. 700 (1923).
47 German-American Nat. Bank v. Lewis, 9 Ala. App. 352, 355, 63 So. 741. 743 (1913). See
generally 12 Am. JuR. 2d Bills and Notes § 1212 (1964).
45
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This split of authority would appear to fall neatly in line with the burden

of producing evidence vs. burden of persuasion problem discussed earlier.
If a jurisdiction adheres to the view that a presumption places only a
burden of producing evidence on a party, it would probably, if applying
the same principle to the NIL, fall under the minority rule. However, a
jurisdiction which prefers the burden of persuasion approach would find
that the NIL presumption created a burden of showing by a preponderance
of the evidence that the fact is true, i.e., due course holding. This is exactly
the type of conflict which precise definitions of terms could have avoided
under the NIL and which has been avoided under the UCM.
The UCC has settled this conflict and adopted the majority view. The
UCC provides that when it is shown that a defense exists, the plaintiff may
cut off that defense by establishing that he is a holder in due course or that
he has acquired the rights of a prior holder in due course. Here again, under
the UCC definition of "burden of establishing," the plaintiff will bear the
full burden of persuasion by a preponderance of the total evidence. 48 The
UCC does not speak in terms of presumptions or prima facie proofs as did
the NIL, but merely states where the burden lies. The plaintiff must show
in all respects that he is a holder in due course, i.e., that the instrument was
taken for value, in good faith, and without notice. 49 It appears that the UCO
has adopted the preferable view.r0 On the principle that the heavier
burden should rest on the party with the easiest access to the evidence, it
seems dear that the burden should be on the holder to show that he is
holding in due course. Otherwise purchasers of instruments could win their
case, not because they are bona fide, but because the defendant might not
be able to find the evidence necessary to show the plaintiff's fraud or bad
faith.5' This section has been praised for its comprehensiveness, organizaComment 3 to UCC § 3-307.
UCO § 3-302; Comment 3 to UCC § 3-307.
50 See BIrrroN, op. cit. supra note 33, § 104, at 263.
51 Originally § 3-307(3) began with the phrase "after evidence of a defense has been
introduced .... " But between the 1952 draft and the 1956 recommendation this phrase
48

49

was changed to read "after it is shown that a defense exists .

. . ."

This was to make

it dear that no change in the quantum of evidence was intended and that the NIL rule
was to be retained. Penney, A Summary of Articles 3 and 4 and Their Impact in New
York, 48 CORNELL L.Q. 47, 62 (1962). Thus, it is clear that since the 1956 revision, the UCC
requires the same amount of proof to establish a defense as was required under prior
law, i.e., a defense shown by a preponderance of the evidence. Therefore, the conclusion
reached in 10 MERcmcL. REv. 211, 213 (1958) that "the trend of the decisions seem (sic)
to closely follow the intent of the statue [sic] [and] the results of these cases appear to require the introduction of a lesser amount of evidence, than that which is required under

the N.I.L., to shift the burden of proof from the maker to the holder," is misleading. This
conclusion was based on one cited case, Budget Charge Accounts, Inc. v. Mullany, 144 A.2d
438 (Pa. Super. 1958), which was decided under 1958 Pennsylvania law. However, Pennsylvania adopted the UCC in 1953, and this section was still in the original form In 1958.

Thus, while the writer's conclusion might be valid under 1958 Pennsylvania law, it is
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tion, clear diction, and anticipation and resolution of many questions.52
UCC section 3-414(2) states:
Unless they otherwise agree indorsers are liable to one another in the
order in which they indorse, which is presumed to be the order in
which their signatures appear on the instrument.
This section deals with the contract of the indorser, and the above-quoted
subsection provides two presumptions. The first is that the indorsers are
liable in the order in which they indorse; the second is that they in fact
indorsed in the order in which their names appear. Parol evidence is admissible to show that they indorsed in another order or that they have made
a separate agreement as to their liability.53 This section does not change the
law under the NIL, although-the second presumption is new. Section sixtyeight of the NIL provides that ".. . indorsers are prima fade liable in the
order in which they indorse; but evidence is admissible to show that as
between or among themselves they have agreed otherwise."54 The main
difference between the NIL and UCC provisions is one of terminology.
Section 3-416(4) creates a presumption, from the addition of words of
guaranty to the signature of one of two or more makers or acceptors, that
the signature is for the accommodation of the others. This entire section
is new; the NIL contains no provision relating to the liability of persons
who sign negotiable instruments as guarantors. The section is intended to
spell out liabilities on the instrument in terms of prevailing commercial
understanding as to the meaning and effect of words of guaranty added to
signatures on negotiable instruments. 3
Section 3-419(2) dealing with conversion of negotiable instruments states:
In an action against a drawee under subsection (1) the measure of the
drawee's liability is the face amount of the instrument. In any other
action under subsection (1) the measure of liability is presumed to be
the face amount of the instrument.
This presumption is the rule generally applied to the conversion of negotiable instruments, i.e., a party's obligation on the instrument is presumed
to be face value.5 6 This is the usual rebuttable presumption and any eviincorrect if applied to any state which is not operating under the original version of the
UCc.
52 Carrington, Banking, Commercial Paper and Investment Securities Under the
Uniform Commercial Code, 14 Wyo. L.J. 198, 204-05 (1960).
53

Comment 4 to UCC § 3-414.

54 Accord, George v. Bacon, 138 App. Div. 208, 123 N.Y. Supp. 103 (1910).
55 See Steinheimer, Impact of the Commercial Code on Liability of Parties to Negotiable
Instruments in Michigan, 53 MicH. L. REv. 171. 203 (19.54).
56 Comment 4 to UCC § 3-419.
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dence may be admitted to show defenses. By contrast, the presumption re7
garding drawees is replaced by a rule of absolute liability.5
Section 3-503(2) provides:
A reasonable time for presentment is determined by the nature of the
instrument, any usage of banking or trade and the facts of the particular case. In the case of the uncertified check which is drawn and payable
within the United States and which is not a draft drawn by a bank the
following are presumed to be reasonable periods within which to
present for payment or to initiate bank collection:
(a) with respect to the liability of the drawer, thirty days after
date or issue whichever is later; and
(b) with respect to the liability of an indorser, seven days after
his indorsement.
This subsection is similar to section 193 of the NIL58 in its language defining
reasonable time. However, the UCC has gone farther in providing specific
time limits for certain instruments. This represents an extension of the
time usually allowed under the cases decided under the NIL.
Where the issue was whether timely presentment had been made for the
purpose of holding secondary parties liable, the law under the NIL consisted largely of the "one day" rule in the case of checks. The cases held that
a holder of a check who did not present the check one day after he had
received it, if drawn on a bank in the same city, discharged prior indorsers
absolutely and discharged the drawer to the extent of the loss occasioned
by the delay. 59 If the check was payable in another city, the collection
process had to be initiated the day after receipt. 60 This rule was poor for
several reasons. 61 Primarily it failed to take into account the varying banking
habits of the community. A large business concern might not be able to
process all its checks received in one day while it might inconvenience a
small business to bank every day. Often an individual will carry a check in
his pocket for several days. Furthermore, general distrust of banking has
disappeared, and, with the advent of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, a longer period should be reasonable. Besides, when businessmen are
57 Ibid.
58 The NIL reads:

In determining what is a "reasonable time" or an "unreasonable

time"

regard is to

be had to the nature of the instrument, the usage of trade or business (if any) with
respect to such instruments, and the facts of the particular case.
NIL § 193.
59 E.g., Seager v. Dauphinee, 284 Mass. 96, 187 N.E. 94 (1933).
60 See cases collected in BRANNAN, NrcoTiABLE INsruMENTs LAW 1296-1302 (7th ed.
Beutel 1948).
61 See generally Leary, Commercial Paper: Some Aspects of Article 3 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 48 Ky. L.J. 198 (1960).
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sufficiently concerned about the length of time checks may be outstanding
to do something about it, the printed legend on the check, "Void after days" usually selects a thirty or sixty day limit as reasonable. 62
It therefore appears that the extension of the time limit in the UCC is a
useful and realistic innovation. The drawer is reasonably expected to stand
behind the check longer than the indorser since he expects it to be paid
from his account and an indorser does not normally expect to pay it. Of
course evidence could be introduced to show that the named time limits
are unreasonable and thus defeat the presumption. However, the UCC has
provided a more realistic approach than that under the NIL. 3
Section 3-510, which deals with evidence of dishonor and notice of dishonor, provides that a regular protest,64 stamp of the drawee, payor or
presenting bank showing a refusal to accept or pay, or any books or records
of the drawee, payor, or collecting bank showing dishonor will be "admissible as evidence and create a presumption of dishonor and of any
notice of dishonor therein shown." 65 The generally accepted rule has been
that a notarized certificate of protest is sufficient prima fade evidence of
the facts contained within the protest.0 0 However the notary's certificate is
not conclusive, 67 and evidence may be given to rebut or disprove the facts
stated in the certificate. 68 The UCC has extended the rule to cover not
only the certificate of protest but also the two protest substitutes, and also
creates both a presumption of dishonor and of any notice of dishonor showm
in the protest certificate. The NIL contained no provision stating the effect
of protest as proof of dishonor.
Other Presumptions in the UCC
Section 8-1059 dealing with securities is similar in wording and effect
62 Leary, supra note 61, at 228 n.82.
63 See Dluge v. Robinson, 204 Pa. Super. 404, 204 A.2d 279, 280 (1964) (seven day limit

under UCC).
64 UCC § 3-510(a); see UCC § 3-509.
65 UCC § 3-510.
66 See, e-g., In re Ma-wjtz's Estate, 286 Pa. 191, 133 Ad. 220, 222 (1926); Latham v. Shelf,
193 App. Div. 576, 185 N.Y. Supp. 278, 279 (1920).
67 See Latham v. Shelf, supranote 66, at 280; Sulzbacher v. Bank of Charleston. 86 Tenn.
201, 6 S.AV. 129 (1887).
68 See Thorn v. Aler, 92 W. Va. 290, 114 S.E. 741, 742 (1922).
69 This section provides:
(1) Securities governed by this Article are negotiable instruments.
(2) In any action on a security
(a) unless specifically denied in the pleadings, each signature on the security or
in a necesary indorsement is admitted;
(b) when the effectiveness of a signature is put in issue the burden of establihing
it is on the party claiming under the signature but the signature is presumed
to be genuine or authorized;
(c) when signatures are admitted or established production of the instrument
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to section 3-307 discussed earlier.7 0 It states that securities are negotiable

instruments under the section, and that, absent specific denial, signatures
on the security or necessary indorsements are admitted. Signatures are
presumed to be genuine, but the ultimate burden of establishing their
authenticity will be on the party claiming under them. Thus, evidence
sufficient to create an issue as to authenticity must be introduced, and then
the presumption will disappear. There the party claiming under the instrument must show authenticity by a preponderance of the total evidence.
Once the signature is admitted or established, a holder is entitled to recover unless a defense is established. This means that the defendant has the

"burden of establishing" within the UCC definition, 7' and would have to
show his defense by a preponderance of the total evidence. Then, once a
defense is established, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff who must show
by a preponderance of the total evidence that he or a person under whom
he claims is one against whom the defense is ineffective.
This section is clear in its effect, but again, as in section 3-307, it is subject to some criticism for its approach to the presumption of authenticity
of signatures. The basis for this presumption is that forgeries rarely appear,
and any evidence on the subject is more accessible to the defendant, and on
this basis it seems unreasonable to allow the presumption to be overcome
by a mere production of evidence to the contrary. 72
Section 4-103(3) provides:
Action or non-action approved by this article or pursuant to Federal
Reserve regulations or operating letters constitutes the exercise of
ordinary care and, in the absence of special instructions, action or
non-action consistent with clearing house rules and the like or with
a general banking usage not disapproved of by this Article, prima facie
constitutes the exercise of ordinary care.73
The use of the term "prima fade" here is unfortunate. This section
basically sets out methods and standards by which ordinary care in banking
practices may be determined. When the UCO speaks in terms of presumptions or burden of establishing it is clear what quantum of evidence will be
entitles a holder to recover on it unless the defendant establishes a defense or a
defect going to the validity of the security; and
(d) after it is shown that a defense or defect exists the plaintiff has the burden
of establishing that he or some person under whom he claims is a person against
whom the defense or defect is ineffective.

UCC § 8-105.
70

See text accompanying notes 39-52 supra.

71 UCO § 1-201(8).
See text accompanying notes 41-42 supra.
UCC § 4-103(3). (Emphasis added.) For definitions of "Federal Reserve regulations,"
"Federal Reserve operating letters," "Clearing House Rules," etc. see Comment 3 to UCC
§ 4-103.
72
73
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required by a party to rebut the presumption or to maintain his burden.
However, when the drafters switch to the term "prima fade" the UCC
clarification in this area suddenly becomes murky. How must a party proceed
against a prima fade case of due care? If due care is treated as a presumption under the UCO, he must only introduce evidence which would create
a triable issue. But if the burden of establishing has thus passed to him,
he must show by a preponderance of the total evidence that the nonexistence
of ordinary care is more probable than is its existence. The Comments are
of little help here. They state that the evidence here is "prima fade only,
thus conferring on the courts the ultimate power to determine ordinary
care in any case where it should appear desirable to do so."' 4 But this is
little or no assistance. The court, through its charge to the jury and control
over the trial, will have the ultimate power over whether "prima facie" here
is treated as creating a presumption or as creating a burden of establishing.
However, perhaps more helpful is the language in the Comments that
"the prima fade rule does, however, impose on the party contesting the
standards to establish that they are unreasonable, arbitrary, or unfair."75
The use of the words "to establish" might indicate that it was the intent of
the drafters to create a burden of establishing here and therefore the prima
fade case of ordinary care could be overcome only by showing by a preponderance of the total evidence that ordinary care did not exist.
Another approach would be to assume that the creation of a prima fade
case here is meant to shift the burden to the opposite party. Burden under
the UCC is defined as a "burden of establishing"; therefore the party against
whom the prima fade case operates will have the burden of persuasion.
However, such a conclusion is speculative and the intent of the drafters
is unclear.76 Use of another term or a definition of prima fade would provide
uniformity from an evidentiary viewpoint, but as the statutory language
now stands "prima fade" will most probably be treated according to state
law and thus will maintain its confused and multifarious meanings. It
would appear that the better approach would have been to provide that
the burden of establishing the non-exercise of ordinary care is on the party
claiming such non-exercise. This would adopt the Morgan-Maguire theory
that when there are sound reasons for creating a presumption or burden, it
should not be so easily rebutted, but should require a showing against it by
a preponderance of the total evidence. Similarly, section 1-202 has provided
that a third party document under an existing contract "shall be prima fade
74 Comment 4 to UCC § 4-103.
75 Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
76 But see I NEv YoRi LAw REVIsION Comm. roR 1955, REPORT o% Tim STuoy oF nu:
UNFoRm ComMEEcuAL CoDE 288 (1955), where it is stated that "presumptions arc in fact
created by this subsection although the word 'presumption' is not used." Howvcver, no
reasons are given for this conclusion.
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evidence of its own authenticity ..... 77 Again the problem is presented
whether the UCC has created a presumption within its definition or has
required a shift in the burden of establishing as defined under the UCC.
This should have been clarified, since such usage could, to an extent, defeat
the basic goal of the UCC-achieving uniformity throughout the states. Although the drafters of the UCC intended to leave some areas open for
future development, it is unlikely that an area such as this will develop
to any beneficial extent.
Section 7-302 of the UCC sets up a method by which an issuer of a
through bill of lading may show the amount of damages he has paid to
a shipper. This method would be used against a connecting carrier who is
primarily liable for damages. The section provides that any "receipt judgment, or transcript thereof" 78 shall show the amount paid by the issuer to
the party damaged. This section was taken from the Interstate Commerce
Act and has been treated under that Act as a typical rebuttable presumption. 79 Similar treatment will undoubtedly be given these words under the
UCC. This section is treated in detail under the section on hearsay. 80
However, since none of the UCC "presumption" or "burden of establishing" terminology was used here, it appears that this section will receive
various treatments by the states regarding the effect of the presumption, i.e.,
whether the burden of producing evidence or the burden of establishing
along with the burden of producing will pass to the party against whom
the presumption operates.
Finally, the use of the word "presumption" in Comment six to section
2-313 should be mentioned. The section deals with express warranties and
section 2-313(l)(c) provides:
Any sample or model which is made part of the basis of the bargain
creates an express warranty that the whole of the goods shall conform
to the sample or model.
Comment six on the above subsection states in part:
In general, the presumption is that any sample or model just as any
affirmation of fact is intended to become a basis of the bargain. But
there is no escape from the question of fact.
The section itself creates no presumption, and the reference by comment
to the word presumption seems erroneous. The section creates no presumption to the effect that if a sample was shown prior to the contract of sale
that the court would be required, barring evidence to the contrary, to find
See text accompanying note 144 infra.
UCC § 7-302(3).
79 See text accompanying note 123 infra.
80 See text accompanying notes 116-133 infra.
77

78
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that the sale was by sample. The question of whether the sample was the
basis of the bargain could be one for the court or jury, depending on the
evidence.8 1

II. HEARSAY
Hearsay has been defined as "testimony in court or written evidence of a
statement made out of court, such statement being offered as an assertion
to show the truth of matters asserted therein, and thus resting for its value
upon the credibility of the out-of-court asserter."8 2
Until the middle of the sixteenth century there was no objection to the
use of hearsay evidence by a jury. However, during the following two
centuries courts gradually came to the conclusion that all statements to be
used as testimony should be made only where the person to be affected by
them has an opportunity of testing them by way of cross-examination. By
the middle of the eighteenth century this rule against hearsay was accepted
as a fundamental part of the law.83 Although the main objection to hearsay
is the lack of opportunity to cross-examine; other reasons espoused for its
rejection are that the statement was not made by a party under oath, that
there is no confrontation by the declarant, and that there is a danger that
84
a witness may report a statement inaccurately.
Gradually some exceptions to the hearsay rule have developed, and it is
chiefly in the area of exceptions that the UCC has had some effect. The
basis for exceptions to the hearsay rule is usually found in a great need
for the evidence, the inaccessibility of the actual declarant, and a high
degree of trustworthiness in the hearsay matter. The UCC has affected the
hearsay rule in four limited areas: proof of dishonor of foreign bills of
exchange; admissibility in evidence of price lists and market quotations;
admissibility of receipts in evidence to show the amount of damages paid
by an initial carrier under a through bill of lading; and proof of facts in
third party documents to a contract.
Proof of Dishonor
Under the NIL the drawer and indorser of a foreign bill of exchange
could not be held liable upon dishonor of the instrument unless it had
been properly protested.8 5 Protest in a strict sense means the formal certifi81 See 1 NEv YORK LAw RE VISION CoMMf. FOR 1955, op. cit. supra note 76, at 286.

82 McCoa suc,

EVIDENCE § 225, at 460 (1954).

83 See generally 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1364-66 (3d ed. 1940).

84 See Id. at §§ 1361-63.
85 NIL § 152. This section states:
Where a foreign bill appearing on its face to be such is dishonored by non-acceptance,
it must be duly protested for non-acceptance, and where such a bill which has not
previously been dishonored by non-acceptance is dishonored by non-payment, it must
be duly protested for non-payment. If it is not so protested, the drawer and endorsers
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cate drawn up and signed by a notary indicating that he had presented the
bill for acceptance and that it had been refused.8 6 The main function of the
certificate of protest is evidentiary,8 7 i.e., to avoid a situation in which
dishonor of a foreign bill would have to be proven by parol evidence. 88
A foreign bill under the NIL was defined as any bill not both drawn and
payable within the same state.8 9
It has generally been agreed at common law and under the NIL that a
notary's certificate of protest is admissible in evidence as an exception to
the hearsay rule to prove dishonor8 0 The basis for this exception is that
the duty to furnish a certificate is sufficiently implied from the nature of a
notary's office to warrant the admission in evidence of his statement without
calling him.91 However, the doctrine of protest is subject to some criticism
since failure to comply with its strict requirements will result in a complete
discharge of drawers and indorsers.9 2 With the speed of modem travel and
the disappearing significance of state boundaries the protest doctrine becomes particularly harsh. A person should not upon failure to protest lose
his rights largely because the check he receives payable in his state was
drawn in another. Yet if a person does protest it can cause a certain amount
of inconvenience and expense. Therefore, a strong case is made in favor of
eliminating protest as a condition precedent to a drawer's or indorser's
liability, and in favor of substituting a new rule of evidence which would
permit easier proof of dishonor.
are discharged. Where a bill does not appear on its face to be a foreign bill, protest
thereof in case of dishonor is unnecessary.
BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSRUMENrs LAW § 152, at 1105 (6th ed. Beutel 1938); see Mlschnlck
v. Dime Say. Bank, 260 Mich. 639, 245 N.W. 541 (1932) (failure to protest dishonorqd

foreign bill of exchange discharged drawer). Liabilities of a drawer were determined by
the law of the place where he drew the bill of exchange. So a bill drawn in New York
payable in Austria is a foreign bill and must be protested in order to hold the drawer even
though Austrian law does not require protest. Amsinck v. Rogers, 189 N.Y. 252, 82 N.E.

134 (1907). Protest was not required for promissory notes payable and negotiable at a
bank and discounted by a bank. Williams v. Paintsville Natl Bank, 143 Ky. 781, 137 S.W.
535 (1911).
88 NIL § 153; see Maury v. Winlock & Toledo Logging & RR., 148 Wash. 572, 269 Pac.

815 (1928); Comment 2 to UCC § 3-509. However, the same term has been used loosely to
refer to the entire process of presentment, notice of dishonor and protest. Gleason v.
Thayer, 87 Conn. 248, 87 At. 790 (1913); see Comment 2 to UCC § 3-509.
87 See Comment 6 to UCO § 3-501.
88 Kardynal v. Grezezinski, 255 Mich. 421, 238 N.W. 213, 214 (1931) (dictum).
89 NIL § 129. For the pre-NIL definitions, see Armstrong v. American Exch. Nat'l Bank
of Chicago, 133 U.S. 433 (1890); Davies & Vincent v. Bank of Commerce, 27 Ariz. 270, 232
Pac. 880 (1925).
90 5 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 83, § 1675.
91 Ibid.
92 See

1

HAWKLAND, A TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 502

(1964).
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The UCG has accomplished this. In so doing it has given broad expansion to hearsay exceptions in this area. First, the UCC has eliminated any
need for protest except where the dishonored draft on its face appears to
be drawn or payable outside the United States; thus eliminating the strict
NIL requirement of protest on drafts between separate states. 03 Even though
the UCC does not always require protest, it could be desirable in certain
situations. 94 For instance, protest could be convenient where process does
not run to another state, where deposition costs would be high, or where a
witness would have to travel long distances to testify as to dishonor. Where
protest is still required, the UCC has reduced the need for a formal protest
by providing two protest substitutes. Section 3-510 provides:
The following are admissible as evidence and create a presumption of
dishonor and of any notice of dishonor therein shown:
(a) a document regular in form as provided in the preceding section
which purports to be a protest;
(b) the purported stamp or writing of the drawee, payor bank or
presenting bank on the instrument or accompanying it stating that
acceptance or payment has been refused for reasons consistent with
dishonor;
(c) any book or record of the drawee, payor bank, or any collecting
bank kept in the usual course of business which shows dishonor,
even though there is no evidence of who made the entry.
Since the two protest substitutes, stamps of the drawee bank and bank
records, will be admitted in evidence to show presumptive95 proof of dishonor, they will dearly be evidence of the facts asserted in the stamp or
record and as such are clearly hearsay.
The first substitute, stamps of the drawee, appears to be a new exception
to the hearsay rule. None of the common law exceptions would have permitted the introduction of a stamp or ticket on a document to show
presumptively the truth of the matter asserted on the stamp. However, for
the stamp, ticket, or other writing to be admissible it must state that acceptance or payment has been refused for "reasons consistent with dishonor."96 These would include stamps stating "not sufficient funds," "account garnished," "no account," or "payment stopped."0 7 The basis of the
93 UCC § 3-501(3). The protest requirement remains in effect as to international drafts
because it is generally required by foreign law. See Comment 6 to UCC § 8-501. Although
§ 3-501(3) does not specifically mention "checks" it would appear that the same rule
applies to international checks, since a check is defined as a "draft drawn on a bank and
payable on demand." UCC § 3-104(2)(b).
94 See UCC § 3-501(3).
95 See text accompanying notes 64-68 supra.
96 UCC § 3-510(b).
97 Comment 2 to UCC § 3-510.
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new exception to the hearsay rule appears to lie in the fact that a drawee's
statement that payment is refused for insufficient funds has always been
commercially acceptable as proof of dishonor, has a high degree of reliability
and should therefore be satisfactory evidence in any court.98
The second exception regarding books and records of a drawee, payor
bank or any connecting bank, is not a new exception to the hearsay rule,
but is an expansion of the common law exception admitting business
records which are regular entries in the course of business. 99 The common
law exception was subject to the limitations that the book entry must be
regular, entered at or near the time of the transactions involved, and a
recorder or his informant must be unavailable. 100 Furthermore, to be admissible the entries had to be "original," and not merely transcribed records
or copies. 101 The most burdensome aspect of this rule was the requirement
that the entrant, or, in the case of a cooperative entry based on information
given by other employees, both the entrant and informants must be proven
to be unavailable for production as witnesses. Accordingly, many courts have
adopted the view that common sense requires a relaxation of these rules,
and have given the trial judge discretion to dispense with the production
of entrants and informants and to permit the records to be verified by a
102
supervising officer who can testify that they have been regularly kept.
This rule would apply where the inconvenience of production outweighs
the value of producing the entrants and informants for examination and
cross-examination. It remained for legislation to do the rest, and many state
legislatures simplified matters by adopting the Uniform Business Records as
Evidence Act. 03 Under this act it is only necessary that a custodian of the
records testify as to a document's mode of preparation, identify the records
and testify whether it was made in the regular course of business at or near
the time of the recorded event. On the basis of this testimony the judge
may decide whether the record should be admissible. 10 4
98 Ibid.
99 See generally Ginsburg, The Admissibility of Business Records in Evidence, 29 Nu.
L. Rav. 60 (1949) (discussion of the hearsay exception).
100 For cases recognizing the rule and explaining its basis, see Missouri Forged Tool Co.
v. St. Louis Car Co., 205 S.W.2d 298, 301 (Mo. App. 1947) (dictum); EdsalU v. Rockland
Paper Co., 38 Del. 495, 194 Ad. 115, 117 (1937) (dictum); Gus Dattilo Fruit Co. v. Louisville & N.R.R., 238 Ky. 322, 37 S.W.2d 856, 857 (1931) (dictum). See also McCoMuIICK, op. Cit.
supra note 82, at § 283.
101 Stark v. Burkitt, 103 Tex. 437, 129 S.W. 343, 344 (1910) (dictum); see 5 Wiovxoa,
op. cit. supra note 80, at §§ 1532, 1558.
102 E.g., Jennings v. United States, 73 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1934); see 5 WxsoaRE, op. cit.
supra note 83, at § 1530.
103 UNIFORM BUSINEss Racoms AS EV ENCE ACr. See generally Note, Revised Business
Entry Statutes: Theory and Practice, 48 CoLum. L. Rav. 920 (1948); 47 I-HAv. L. Rav.

1044 (1934).
104 UNIFORi BUSINEss R ecoRs As EvIDEENC

Aer § 2; see Rossomanno v. Laclede Cab Co.,
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The UCC provision, allowing proof of protest by "any book or record,"
is stated in language even broader than that of the Uniform Business
Records as Evidence Act. On its face the UCC seems to require only a
showing that the record used to prove dishonor was kept in the usual
course of business. The UCC explicitly provides that such records -ill be
admissible "even though there is no evidence of who made the entry."
There is no provision requiring a showing of the time of the entry, or that
any particular person testify as to the particular entry's being made in the
usual course of business. Even though the UCC does not spell out these
requirements, it is doubtful that failure to do so will result in any great
variations. The dishonor of an instrument would generally be recorded
almost immediately upon receipt, and any of a number of bank officials
could testify that such records are kept in the usual course of the banking
business. The above provision, along with that admitting stamps in evidence, is based on the high improbability that bank records, or the records
of the drawee, will show any dishonor which did not in fact occur; or that
a holder will attempt to proceed on the basis of dishonor if he could in fact
have obtained payment. 10 5 This section, simplifying the admissibility in
evidence of books and records, will not make any major change in the law of
a state which has adopted the Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act,
but in a state which has not done so the UCC will make a marked change in
this area of hearsay.
The requirement of producing all entrants and informants undoubtedly
served its purpose in an era when small businesses were predominant. However, the showing of the identity and unavailability of absent entrants or
informants where the records are those of a large business imposes a burden
of preliminary proof which may be so expensive as to be prohibitive. In large
business organizations records will be kept by numerous persons, and information for the records will come from countless sources. Furthermore,
even if the entrants or informants can be located, it is doubtful whether
they will have any recollection of a particular entry, and their evidence
will be a routine statement that they correctly reported and recorded the
matter in question. On this basis it would seem that the UCC has adopted a
realistic and commercially reasonable approach to proof of dishonor.
Price Lists and Market Quotations
In a few narrow and usually well-defined classes of cases an exception has
been made to the hearsay rule in order to admit into evidence certain commercial and professional lists, registers, and reports. Although newspaper
328 S.W.2d 677, 681 (Mo. 1960); Green v. Cleveland, 50 Ohio L. Abs. 605, 79 N.E.2d 676,
677, ajf'd, 150 Ohio 441, 83 NX.2d 63 (1948). For a simplified version of the Uniform Act
see UN1oF
RuLE oF EvmENCE 63 (13).
105 Comment 3 to UCC § 3-510.
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articles are generally held inadmissible to prove the truth of the facts they
contain, 10 price lists and market reports are an important exception.',
Such lists and reports are also found in trade journals and magazines circulated either within various occupational groups or to the public generally.
However, the limits applied to this hearsay exception are somewhat indefinite. Some courts have followed a strict view in holding such evidence inadmissible unless the manner in which the list was compiled, where the
information was obtained, and whether the quotations of prices were derived
from actual sales or otherwise is shown 08 Various reasons have been advanced for excluding such documents and the testimony based thereon.
A newspaper summary of prices covering several months has been rejected
on the grounds that, since the prices were not current, they would probably
not be relied on by the business world. 100 A price list printed exclusively
for company salesmen and not for the public generally has also been rejected. 110 Prior to the adoption of the UCG, Massachusetts"' would not
12
admit such reports, however reliable, if better evidence was obtainable.
The UCC has put an end to some of these somewhat unrealistic common
law views."" Under UCC section 2-724 any price list or market report
108 E.g., Kengla v. Stewart, 82 Ariz. 365, 313 P.2d 424 (1957); State v. Otis Elevator Co.,

10 N.J. 504, 92 A.2d 385 (1952); Bebbington v. California W. States Life Ins. Co., 30 Cal.
2d 157, 180 P.2d 673 (1947).
107 E.g., Baush Mach. Tool Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 79 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1935);

Mohr v. Shultz, 86 Idaho 531, 388 P.2d 1002 (1964); State v. Carrano, 27 N.J. Super. 382,
99 A.2d 426 (1953); see 6 WIGMORa, op. cit. supra note 83, at § 1704.
108 Whelan v. Lynch, 60 N.Y. 469 (1875), discussed in 6 WiGMO.E, op. cit. stipra note
83, at § 1704; see Atlantic Nat'l Bank v. Moore, 29 Ariz. 346, 241 Pac. 601 (1925) (evidence
of market price inadmissible where source undisclosed and uncertain); BaglIn v. Earle
Eagle Mining Co., 540 Utah 572, 184 Pac. 190 (1919) (evidence of stock price hearsay where
method of compilation unclear); Jones v. Ortel, 114 Md. 205, 78 At. 1030 (1910) (evidence
inadmissible where paper not shown to be accepted by trade). But see Mt. Vernon Brewing Co. v. Teschner, 108 Md. 158, 69 At!. 702 (1908) (evidence admissible where accepted
by trade, even without evidence of how obtained).
109 See Atlantic Nat'l Bank v. Korrick, 29 Ariz. 468, 242 Pac. 1009 (1926); Atlantic Nat'l
Bank v. Moore, 29 Ariz. 346, 241 Pac. 601 (1926). In these cases the courts held that for a
newspaper to be admissible it had to be found reliable by persons dealing with the
commodity, and the prices must be published contemporaneously with the market In
order that they might be relied on.
110 National Cash Register Co. v. Underwood, 56 R.I. 379, 185 At. 909 (1936).
111 MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. cl. 106 (1963).
112 Doherty v. Harris, 230 Mass. 341, 119 N.E. 863 (1918); cf., Pennsylvania RR. v.
Newmyer, 100 A.2d 456, (1953); Pierce v. Miller, 107 Neb. 851, 187 N.W. 105 (1922).
113 UCC § 2-724. This section states:
Whenever the prevailing price or value of any goods regularly bought and sold In, any
established commodity market is in issue, reports on official publications or trade
journals or in newspapers or periodicals of general circulation published as the reports
of such market shall be admissible in evidence. The circumstances of the preparation
of such a report may be shown to affect its weight but not its admissibility.
Ibid. Compare UNIEOam RuLE oF EVIDENCE 63 (30).
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printed in official publications, trade journals, newspapers, or periodicals of
general circulation will be admissible; and, in the absence of a compelling
challenge, such reports should offer an adequate basis for a verdict.1 4 This
section approves the sensible approach of allowing the evidence to be admitted while its weight may be questioned. Many of the stricter rules not
admitting such evidence are more properly limited to the weight of such
evidence and not to its admissibility.
In this area the UCG gives uniformity and liberality to an already existing
exception to the hearsay rule. This codification can be justified and commended on the same basic principles which allowed the early judicial
exceptions. The basic theory of the hearsay rule is that many possible sources
of inaccuracy and untrustworthiness which may lie underneath a witness'
assertions may be exposed by cross-examination. But this theory may be
superfluous in an instance where a statement offered is dearly free from
the risk of inaccuracy and untrustvorthiness. Furthermore, the theory may
be impossible to apply where the procurement of the witness would be
impossible or highly impracticable. These principles, circumstantial probability of trustworthiness and necessity," 5 are the basis for allowing market
reports and price lists to overcome hearsay objections. The necessity of
admission in these cases lies in the inaccessibility of the authors, compilers,
and publishers and in the enormous inconvenience in summoning every
person who took part in making the list or record. Also the probability of
the trustworthiness of such reports is exceedingly high. The author knows
that his work will be consulted by professionals and that it will have no
professional or commercial value unless it is accurate. Furthermore, there
ordinarily would be no motive for an author of such a commercial report
to falsify that report. Use of the compilations by a trade or profession over
a considerable length of time complements the reliability argument. Thus,
the adoption of the broad UCO rule provides a sensible approach in a business world which demands ever-increasing use of such commercial reports.
Proof of Damages-ThroughBill of Lading
Section 7-302(3) of the UCC provides:
The issuer of such through bill of lading or other document shall be
entitled to recover from the connecting carrier or such other person in
possession of the goods when the breach of the obligation under the
document occurred, the amount it may be required to pay to anyone
entitled to recover on the document therefor, as may be evidenced by
any receipt, judgment, or transcript thereof, and the amount of any
114 Comment to UCC § 2-724.
115 For a good discussion of these principles see 5 WimsoRE, op.

dt.

supra noe 85, at

§§ 1421-2.
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expense reasonably incurred by it in defending any action brought by
anyone entitled to recover on the document therefor.
This section makes the issuer of a through bill of lading110 liable for loss
caused by the issuer or any connecting carrier. It also gives the issuer, after
it has been required to pay the loss, a remedy over against the particular
carrier causing the loss. 1 17 In an action against the particular connecting
carrier, the issuer may prove the amount of damages he paid or must pay by
"any receipt, judgment, or transcript thereof. 11 8
This section of the UCG was based on the Carmack Amendment119 to the
Interstate Commerce Act, and subsection three, quoted above, allowing
proof of damages by any receipt or transcript of a judgment, was taken
verbatim from that amendment. This part of the amendment was intended
not only to simplify the remedy of the shipper, but also to make the remedy
over of the initial carrier or issuer of the through bill of lading as complete
and convenient as possible. 120 Decisions under this section of the UCC will
probably be strongly influenced by judicial interpretations of the Carmack
Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act. This subsection not only
changes the law of evidence, but on its face leaves some questions open.
These questions have, however, been settled under Interstate Commerce Act
decisions. The UCC does not state whether the party ultimately liable, i.e.,
the connecting carrier at fault, may be joined as a third party defendant, but
this practice has been allowed under the Interstate Commerce Act. 12 1
Further, there is some ambiguity as to the procedural effect of the words
"shall be entitled to recover ... the amount it may be required to pay to
anyone entitled to recover on the document therefor, as may be evidenced
by any receipt, judgment, or transcript thereof."'2 2 It is not dear whether
this is intended to be conclusive or prima facie evidence. Although the words
sound conclusive, it has been held under the Interstate Commerce Act that
these words create a prima fade case only. 23 This evidence, of course, will
116 A through bill of lading is one by which a railroad contracts to transport over its

own line for a certain distance carloads of merchandise or stock, there to deliver same
to its connecting lines to be transported to the place of destination at a fixed rate
per carload for the whole distance.
BLACK, LAW DicrioNAY 210 (4th ed. 1951).
117 UCC § 7-302(l)(2).
118 UCC § 7-802(3).
119 49 U.S.C. § 20(12) (1964).
120 See Kansas City & M. Ry. v. New York Cent. & H.R.R., 110 Ark. 612, 168 S.W. 171,

174 (1914).
121 See First Flight Co. v. National Carloading Corp., 209 F. Supp. 730, 733 (E.D. Tenn.
1962).
122 UCC § 7-302(3). That recovery of the judgment is not a condition precedent under
the Carmack Amendment, see Palmer v. Agwilines, 42 F. Supp. 239, 242 (ED.N.Y. 1941).
123 Central of Ga. Ry. v. Sims, 161 Ala. 295, 58 So. 826 (1910) (statute does not
violate due process).
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be prima fade only as to amount of damages, and will have no bearing on
the issue of whether the third party was or was not the cause of the damage.
The admission of an official document, such as a transcript of record, into
evidence will involve no change in evidence law, as this is a standard exception to the hearsay rule. 2 4 Judgments are generally admissible to show the

amount and fact of a recovery. 225
The provision that a receipt of payment will constitute evidence of the
amount of damages represents a change in the law of evidence. Most courts
have followed the rule that an ordinary receipt for money given by a third
person is not competent evidence, but is merely a hearsay declaration of the
person who signed it, not made under oath and made without opportunity
for cross-examination. 20 However, a number of courts have recognized that
receipts may be admissible in evidence under various exceptions to the
hearsay rule, such as that approving the reception of ancient documents,1'2
or that admitting declarations of a deceased person against his interest.'2
Receipts have occasionally been admitted as corroborative evidenceLm and
a few courts have, without discussing competency, held such receipts admissible.130 Occasionally receipts have been held admissible as official documents where they were given by a public official whose duty required that
he receive payments and issue receipts.' 3 '

The UCC has created a new exception. It will apply to receipts issued
by a shipper for payment to him by the issuer of a through bill of lading.
Any receipt will be held admissible and will constitute prima fade evidence
of the amount paid. Although this section does not explicitly state that his
evidence is prima fade, that is the interpretation given by the courts to the
similar provision in the Interstate Commerce Act."2
Of course any payment made by the issuer to the shipper in settlement
for damages must be made subject to the usual standards of good faith and
commercial reasonableness. Thus, a connecting carrier who is sued by the
issuer for causing the actual damage could undoubtedly introduce evidence
124 5 WIGMioE, op. cit. supra note 83, at § 1684.
125 JONES, COMMENTARIES ON EVIDENCE §§ 1806, 1825 (2d ed. 1926).
120 See Wisconsin Steel Co. v. Maryland Steel Co., 203 Fed. 403 (7th Cir. 1913) (dictum);
Hornsby v. Vensen, 12 Ga. App. 696, 78 S.E. 267 (1913).
127 Woods v. Montevallo Coal & Transp. Co., 84 Ala. 560, 3 So. 475 (1888) (receipt over

20 years old).
128 E.g., Wilson v. Birt, 77 Colo. 206, 255 Pac. 563 (1925).
Hayes v. Illinois Cont. KR., 83 So. 2d 160, 164 (1955) (dictum); Cain v. Mead, 66
Minn. 195, 68 N.V. 840 (1896); see Bushnell v. Bushnell, 103 Conn. 583, 131 At. 432, 436
(1925).
130 See Carmichael v. Williams, 286 S.W.2d 456, 459 (1956); Knoble v. Ritter, 145 Pa.
Super. 149, 20 A.2d 848, 851 (1941).
'29

131 See Laist v. Nichols, 139 Cal. App. 202, 33 P.2d 866. 869 (1934) (tax receipt);
Rogers v. Keith, 148 Ala. 225, 42 So. 446 (1906).
132 See note 123 supra.

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol1/iss1/8

26

N/A: The Law of Evidence in the Uniform Commercial Code

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW
showing actual fraud, or such gross negligence in settlement that it would
constitute a legal fraud. This was the approach taken in interpreting the
133
Interstate Commerce Act.
The relaxation of the hearsay rule in this area appears to be a useful and
realistic approach. This relaxation will simplify the remedy of the initial
carrier and avoid, in most cases, the necessity of producing as witnesses the
parties who actually made the receipt. A false receipt would be so simple to
identify in a case such as this that it is highly unlikely that a person would
attempt a falsification. This factor, coupled with the inconveniences of
producing the actual signer, provide a sound basis for allowing this hearsay
exception.
The main problem with this section is that it leaves a few questions unanswered which could have been easily clarified by a few additional words,
either in the statute itself or in the comments. For instance, it should be
pointed out that the receipt or judgment constitute prima fade, and not conclusive proof of damages. It would also be useful to add that the connecting
carriers may be joined as third party defendants by the issuer if he so
desires. Even though these problems have been largely resolved by case
law under the Interstate Commerce Act, some sort of official darification by
the drafters should have been supplied.
Finally, section 1-202 provides:
A document in due form purporting to be a bill of lading, policy or
certificate of insurance, official weigher's or inspector's certificate, consular invoice or any other document authorized or required by the
contract to be issued by a third party shall be prima fade evidence of
its own authenticity and genuineness and of the facts stated in the
document by the third party. (Emphasis added.)
The last clause of the above provision clearly creates a new exception
to the hearsay rule. The list of documents is meant to be illustrative. The
exception appears to be based on the common business experience that such
documents are almost always reliable.13 4 This new exception will relieve a
party from the burden of bringing to court the many persons who may be
involved in third party contracts. However, it should be noted that this
exception applies only to actions arising out of the contract which authorized the document. So if an action were based on a bill of lading, even
though the bill might be ancillary to a larger contract, this section would
not apply and standard hearsay objections would be allowed.
133 See Kansas City & M. Ry. v. New York Cent. & H.R.R., 110 Ark. 612, 163 S.W. 171

(1914) (dictum).
134 Comment 2 to UCC § 1-202.

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 1966

27

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [1966], Art. 8
EVIDENCE IN THE UCC
Authentication
"A writing, of itself, is evidence of nothing, and therefore is not, unless
accompanied by proof of some sort, admissible as evidence." 135 This state-

ment represents the common law attitude toward the admission of documents into evidence. As a general rule, before writings or documents will be
received in evidence, their due and valid execution or genuineness and
authenticity must be established.13 This rule has been applied to writings
of all kinds.' 37 Therefore, a writing and any signature on it must be
proved or identified before it will be admissible in evidence.1 8 In a few
special situations, however, proof of authenticity would not be required.
These situations include: (1) admissions by opponents of a document's
genuineness; 139 (2) ancient documents;' 1 0 (3) acknowledged instruments;1l
(4) replies to letters. 14' Also, proof of execution or authentication may be
dispensed with in some situations where statutes require proof of authenticity only if execution has been denied or otherwise appropriately challenged.' 43 This is the approach taken under the UCG. The drafters have
relaxed the rule requiring preliminary proof of authenticity in several areas.
These areas include third party documents under a contract, signatures on
negotiable instruments, and certificates of protest.
Third Party Documents
Section 1-202 of the UCC provides:
A document in due form purporting to be a bill of lading, policy or

certificate of insurance, official weigher's or inspector's certificate, consular invoice, or any other document authorized or required by the
contract to be issued by a third party shall be prima fade evidence
135 Stamper v. Griffin, 20 Ga. 312, 320-21 (1856).
136 See, e.g., Toho Bussan Kaisha, Ltd. v. American President Lines, Ltd., 265 F.2d
418, 422-23 (2d Cir. 1959).
237 See 7 Wimioz, EvmcE § 2145 (3d ed. 1940).

138 See, e.g., Summers v. McDermott, 138 F.2d 338, 339 (3d Cir. 1943).
'39 Tracy, The Introduction of Documentaiy Evidence, 24 IowA L. Rav. 436 (1939).

140 The theory of admissibility of such a document is that of necessity. So long a time
has lapsed that witnesses are not likely to be available. The general rule is that the documeni must be at least 30 years old, e.g., Fronsoe v. Bushnell, 251 Fed. 850 (6th Cir. 1918),
must come from proper custody, Carter v. Maryland & P. Ry., 112 Md. 599, 77 At. 301
(1910), under circumstances which are not suspicious, see Schmitt v. City of Carbondale,
257 Pa. 451, 101 Ad. 755 (1917), and in certain instances the proponent must prove possession of an instrument of conveyance, Beverly v. Burke, 9 Ga. 440 (1851).
141 See 9 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 137, at § 2576.
142 See 7 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 137, at § 2153. Proper proof in the record that

the original letter was sent to which the proferred document is a reply is an essential
prerequisite. Consolidated Grocery Co. v. Hammond, 175 Fed. 641 (th Cir. 1910).
143 See note 145 infra.

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol1/iss1/8

28

N/A: The Law of Evidence in the Uniform Commercial Code

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW
of its own authenticity and genuineness and of the facts stated in the
document.
This section rejects the need for a preliminary showing of authenticity, but
only for documents offered in evidence which have been required under an
existing contract. Therefore, the applicability of the section is limited to
actions arising out of the contract which authorized the document. The
documents listed in the sections are intended to be illustrative and not all
inclusive, 144 and such documents will constitute prima facie evidence of
their authenticity.
Although this section is limited in scope, it provides a useful innovation
since most documents which it covers have traditionally been found reliable
by the business community. The section is actually quite similar in effect to
those statutes enacted in some states which permit the admission into evidence of any relevant document without preliminary proof of authenticity,
14
as long as it is not specifically denied or challenged. 5
Signatures
Similar to the provisions for third party documents are the provisions for
establishing signatures on negotiable instruments and securities.1 40 Both
relevant sections provide that unless a signature is specifically denied in the
pleadings, it is admitted. This changes the old law which required preliminary proof of authenticity of all signatures. 147 The Comments state that
the reason for requiring a specific denial, is to give a plaintiff notice of a
claim of forgery or lack of authority of the signer, and thus to give the
plaintiff an opportunity to prepare his defenses.1 48 Whether a denial will
be based on information and belief, or on knowledge insufficient to form a
40
belief will depend on local pleading rules.
The plaintiff is not required to prove a signature's authenticity until some
evidence is introduced which would support a finding that the signature is
forged or unauthorized. This is due to the fact that section 3-307(1)(b)
creates a presumption that signatures are genuine. To reiterate, signatures
will not be in issue at all until specifically denied. But once denied, even
though they are in issue, the defendant will not have to prove their authenticity until the presumption in his favor is defeated.
144

Comment 2 to UCC § 1-202.

145 See McCoaxca, EvIDENCE § 186, at 396-97 (1954).
146 Compare UCO § 1-202 (third party documents), with UCC § 3-307 (ncgotiablc
instruments) and UCC § 8-105 (securities).

147

See Comment 1 to UCC § 3-307.

148

Comment 1 to UCC § 3-307.

149 Ibid.
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Evidence of Dishonor
Section 3-510, which gives the effect of protest as evidence, and provides
two substitutes for protest as proof of dishonor, has not made any substantial
change in authentication requirements. Although authenticity is mentioned
in the Comments, the statute itself makes no reference to authentication
requirements. It merely provides that a formal certificate of protest, a
stamp by the drawee, or bank records "are admissible in evidence and
create a presumption of dishonor ....
However, in the Comments the drafters state that "a document regular in
form which purports to be a protest" will not require the holder to prove
authenticity, although its authenticity may be overturned by contrary evidence. 151 This is not new; a certificate of protest has generally been held
admissible without proof of authenticity, since it is notarized and sufficient
authority is implied from the notary's office and from his seal to waive any
need for further authentication. 52 The Comments make no reference to
authenticity requirements for the protest substitutes, i.e., stamp of the
drawee and bank records. With no specific provision, courts will probably
follow the common law rules and require proof of authenticity of any stamp
and records, even though the words in the statute, "are admissible in evidence," might be interpreted to imply that no showing of authenticity is
required unless a specific objection is raised. This is unfortunate, as it
seems highly unlikely that checks returned with an "insufficient funds"
stamp or bank records would ever be forged or unauthorized. The authentication of such documents may well require unnecessary and burdensome
documentation that could have been easily avoided by a few minor changes
in the wording.
Relevancy
The UCC contains few provisions concerning relevancy. However, this
topic does not lend itself to any sort of extensive statutory treatment. This
conclusion is based on the premise that the relevancy of any fact is tested
mainly by logic. The inferences which might reasonably be drawn from a
fact will continue to be questions for the courts to decide on the basis of
53
common sense.'
The Uniform Rules of Evidence define relevant evidence: "Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency in reason to prove any material
fact. 54 This definition encompasses the two main factors on which evidence
is often excluded from a trial as irrelevant. First, the evidence must be
150 UCC § 3-510.
151 Comment 1 to UCC § 3-510.
1.52 See note 87 supra, cf. Kardynal v. Grezezinski, 255 Mich. 421, 238 N.V. 213 (1931).
153 See Commissioner's Note to UNwFomt RuLE or EVrDENCE 1(2).
154 UN Foam RULE OF EVIDENcE

1(2).
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material, that is, the proposition which it is meant to prove must be properly
provable in that case. For instance, since contributory negligence is no
defense under workmen's compensation laws, evidence offered of such negligence would be immaterial. 1 5i Second, the evidence offered must tend to
be probative of the proposition at which it is directed. Various tests have
been espoused for determining relevancy, 5 0 but the better method appears
to be to ask whether the evidence offered renders the desired inference more
probable than it would be without the evidence. 57 The question of relevancy
is primarily one for the court, and whether any particular item is relevant
or not will depend on the facts of each case. Thus, a categorical or statutory
treatment of relevancy to any large extent would be pointless.
However relevance is not the final test. It should also appear that the
benefits of using the evidence outweigh the burdens. Admissions of some
relevant evidence could have such bad side effects that it would be excluded
on those grounds. Evidence could, even though relevant, arouse the passions
of a jury and thus prejudice the case. 158 Also, evidence might create a side
issue that could unduly distract the jury from main issues.150 The evidence
offered may consume an undue amount of time,'0L or might be an unfair
surprise.16' McCormick, in discussing the desirability of setting fixed
standards in the field of relevancy, aptly stated:
It seems better to discard the term "legal relevancy" altogether. Its use
tends to emphasize conformity to precedent in an area where the need
for discretionary responsibility for weighing of value against dangers
in the particular case should be stressed.' 62
Section 1-205 deals with and defines the terms "course of dealing" and
"usage of trade." The UCC does not give any absolute rule regarding the
relevancy of these terms, but generally notes that they "give particular
meaning to and supplement or qualify terms of an agreement."' 03 Course of
dealing is restricted to a sequence of conduct between the parties, such as a
practice or method of dealing which regularly occurs in a given locality,
155 See McCoRMICK, op. cit. supra note 145, § 151, at 314.

156 These tests are discussed in McComicK, op. cit. supra note 145, § 152, at 317-18.
157 Professor McCormick approves this rule. Id. at 318. See also James, Relevancy,
Probability and the Law, 29 CA~ir. L. REv. 689, 699 (1941).
158 Rogers v. Rogers, 80 N.H. 96, 114 Ad. 270 (1921).
159 Veer v. Hagematn, 334 Ill. 23, 165 N.E. 175 (1929); McCaffrey v. Schwartz, 285
Pa. 561, 132 Ad. 810 (1926).
160 "... so far as the introduction of collateral issues goes, that objection is a purely
practical one.-a concession to the shortness of life." Reeve v. Dennett, 145 Mass. 23, 11
N.E. 938, 943-44 (1887) (Holmes, J.).
161 Kum v. Radencic, 193 Old. 126, 141 P.2d 580 (1943); Thompson v. American Steel

& Wire Co., 317 Pa. 7, 175 AtI. 541 (1934); see James, supra note 157, at 703.
162 McCoRMICK, op. cit. supra note 145, § 152, at 321.
163 UCC § 1-205(3).
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vocation, or trade. It is a factor to use in finding the true commercial
164
meaning of an agreement.
Thus, the UCC has defined these terms in a general section. This was not
done under the Uniform Sales Act, although that act, in several instances,
recognized the probative value of such evidence. 165 This does not represent a
change in the law, but merely a clarification and definition. W~igmore recognized the utility of such evidence and stated, regarding its relevance:
In evidencing a custom of usage (i.e., the habit of a body of persons) by
specific instances, the . . . principle . . . is applicable . . . that the

instances offered (a) should be sufficiently numerous to indicate a fairly
regular course of business, and (b) should occur under conditions substantially similar to that in question. 166
Of course, even though the UCC provides that a course of dealing and usage
of trade may be useful in interpreting an agreement, such factors must be
relevant in that they must pertain to an issue in the case and must have
probative value. The UCC has also provided that evidence of usage of
trade may not be admissible if, in the court's opinion, unfair surprise has
occurred. The party using such evidence may give notice that he will use
such evidence, and the sufficiency of this notice will also be a question for
the court. 167 This is in accord with the view that even though certain evidence may be relevant, there may be other more powerful factors which
could prevent its admission, e.g., unfair surprise. It is doubtful whether this
section will have any tangible effect on the law of evidence in this area other
than providing the courts with a rather broad definition of the terms "course
of dealing" and "usage of trade."
Section 2-723 deals with the proof of market price in the case of anticipatory breach of a sales contract. The section provides that damages based
on market price will be determined as of the time the aggrieved party
learned of the breach. 168 The section then goes on to state that if evidence
is not available at the time or place where the breach occurs to show market
price, then evidence of the price in a commercially reasonable substitute
time or place may be used.169 Again, such evidence, if it pertains to usage
of trade, even if relevant, may not be used without proper notice to the
other party in order to prevent surprise. The following section' 70 states that
market reports and other general periodicals may be used to determine
164
165
166

See Comment 4 to UCC § 1-205.
See UNiFoum SALEs Aer §§ 9(1), 15(5). 18(2), 71.
2 IVIGMORF, op. cit. supra note 137, § 379, at 816; sec I Wicao=E op. it. supra note

137, § 94.

UCC § 1-205(6).
168 UCC § 2-723(1).
167
169

UCC § 2-723(2).

170 UCC § 2-724.
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market priceY1 The section implies the obvious, that evidence of current
prices of goods will be relevant to the issue of determining any damages
based on market price.
Section 3-503(2) is similar in effect to the above section. This subsection
merely provides that in determining a reasonable time for presentment,
one must look to the nature of the instrument, usage of banking or trade,
and the facts of the particular case. This is similar to the mode of determination stated in section 193 of the NIL. It is implied here that usages may be
relevant, but again, relevancy will ultimately rest in the discretion of the
court and the facts of any particular case. Section 1-205 would apply here,
and notice would have to be given that evidence of a usage of trade was
being introduced.
Section 2-208 takes the strongest step regarding relevancy in the UCC.
That section provides:
(I) Where the contract for sale involves repeated occasion for performance by either party with knowledge of the nature of the performance and opportunity for objection to it by the other, any course of
performance accepted or acquiesced in without objection shall be
relevant to determine the meaning of the agreement.
(3) Subject to the provisions of the next section on modification and
waiver, such course of performance shall be relevant to show a waiver
or modification of any term inconsistent with such course of performance.
Under this section a course of performance will always be relevant to
determine the meaning of an agreement. Since section 1-205(6) applies only
to usage of trade, it would not be necessary here to give notice to the other
party that evidence relating to a course of dealing would be introduced.
This is reasonable since such material is readily accessible to the two parties
and there would be no unfair surprise. Course of dealing relates only to
conduct between the conducting parties and not to conduct of other men
in the business as a whole.
Although writers feel iron-clad rules such as this one regarding relevancy
are improper 72 there would appear to be little danger here that such evidence would ever be immaterial or without probative value. Perhaps it
would have been preferable to use the word admissible rather than the word
relevant. The use of the word relevant implies that such evidence will
always have probative value, and this might not always be the case. However, regardless of probative value, it could have been stated that such evi171

See text accompanying notes 106-115 supra.

172 See text accompanying note 162 supra.
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dence will always be admissible, and then the jury would have been allowed
to weigh the relevance as it sees fit. Alternatively, it could have been provided that such evidence shall not be excluded on grounds of relevancy.
This would appear to be more in line with the proper definition of the term
since it could hardly be stated about any fact that it will always be relevant

in a class of cases. This is, of course, merely a matter of semantics and definition; the effect of the section will be the same regardless of which phraseology is adopted.
CONCLUSION

A survey of evidence law in the UCC reveals several factors. A few sections
were drafted with the dear intent of affecting evidentiary aspects of commercial law. These sections, in general, show a modern approach and a
desire to avoid the older time-consuming and unnecessary rules. Examples
of sections with this beneficial approach are those simplifying the authentication process, and those allowing broader exceptions to the hearsay rule.
However, other sections of the UCC may have an effect on evidence law
that the drafters may well have wished to avoid. Those areas using undefined and confusing terminology, such as the use of "prima fade," will
certainly not lend any uniformity to the commercial law of the nation.
Although the over-all effect of the UCC on evidence law is good, the
statutes do not show the dose consideration which evidence problems
deserve. Although it would not be a simple matter to regulate the states in
this regard, it is dear that different approaches to evidence under similar
factual situations could result in diametrically opposed results in different
states. This factor would show that, to achieve uniformity, more than a
passing consideration of this problem is necessary. Where the drafters
treated evidence problems specifically, they showed an intent to liberalize
old rules and facilitate speedier and more efficient trial procedures. A liberal
judicial approach toward evidence problems in cases decided under the
UCC will further the main purposes behind the creation of such uniform
laws.
.A. B., III
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